2.3. Restrictive agreements

	Horizontal ^(b)		Vertical ^(b)		Composite (b)		Altogether (b)		% of cases	Initiated ex officio	% of cases initiated ex officio
Illegal agreements	4	1	0	0	0	0	4	1	26.7	4	36.4
Termination of proceedings after susponsion	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	13.3	2	18.2
Conditional approval	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0.0
GVH interventions altogether	6	1	0	0	0	0	6	1	40.0	6	54.5
Individual exemption	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	13.3	1	9.1
Exempted under a block exemption regulation (c)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Not proibited agreement [©]	1	1	0	0	2	0	3	1	20.0	2	18.2
Non restrictive agreement ^(c)	1	0	3	1	0	1	4	2	26.7	2	18.2
Cases altogether	10	3	3	1	2	1	15	5	100.0	11	100.0
% of cases	66.7		20.0		13.3		100.0				
Not notified	1		0		0		1				
Initiated ex officio	9		1		1		11				
% of cases initiated ex officio	81.8		9.1		9.1		100.0				
Fines (1000 HUF)	7,000		0		0		7,000				
% of fines	100.0		0.0		0.0		100.	0			

2.3. Restrictive agreements

(b) The second sub-coloumns in italic present the accumulations.

(These are cases in which the decisions were based on more than one Article of the Competition Act. In order to avoid information-loss and accumulation, complex cases are represented in the table according to the most serious infringement involved. The other types of infringements are presented in italic, in the accumulation coloumns.

(c) Formal decisions on the termination of proceedings in cases started ex officio.

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